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THE INEXTRICABLE LINK BETWEEN CONDITIONALS AND 
LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE 




There is a profound, but frequently ignored relationship between logical consequence (formal 
implication) and material implication. The first repeats the patterns of the latter, but with a 
wider modal reach. It is argued that this kinship between formal and material implication 
simply means that they express the same variety of implication, but differ in scope. Formal 
implication is unrestricted material implication. This apparently innocuous observation has 
some significant corollaries: (1) conditionals are not connectives, but arguments; (2) the 
traditional examples of valid argumentative forms are metalogical principles that express the 
properties of logical consequence; (3) formal logic is not a useful guide to detect valid 
arguments in the real world; (4) it is incoherent to propose alternatives to the material 
implication while accepting the classical properties of formal implication; (5) the counter-
examples to classical argumentative forms and conditional puzzles are unsound. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper aims to contribute to the traditional discussion about logical consequence from new 
and unexplored angles. It is almost universally accepted that conditional sentences should be 
interpreted as connectives alongside disjunctions and conjunctions. In this view, conditionals 
are statements about the world that can be true or false depending on the truth-values of their 
components. They can work as premises or conclusions in an argument, but they shouldn’t be 
confused with arguments. One hypothesis about the truth-conditions of conditional sentences 
is the material account. This hypothesis states that natural language conditionals are logically 
equivalent to assertions of material implication, i.e., a conditional sentence is true if, and only 
if, it is not the case that both the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. This hypothesis 
is widely unpopular among conditional experts due to its many counter-intuitive features. For 
example, it implies that a conditional will be automatically true if the antecedent is false or the 
consequent is true. These consequences motivate alternative systems of conditional logic. 
 On the other hand, we have arguments. They are attempts to defend a conclusion based 
on one or more premises. An argument is thought to be valid when the conclusion is a logical 
consequence of the premises. According to the classical account of logical consequence, an 
argument is valid if, and only if, it is not the case that both the premises are true and the 
conclusion is false in any possible world. This position also has its fair share of counter-
intuitive features, such as that any argument will be trivially valid due to contradictory premises 
or a tautological conclusion. But unlike the counter-intuitive features of the material 
implication, these results are not widely perceived as being problematic enough to abandon the 
classical account of logical consequence, which remains very popular to this day. So, to sum 
up, conditional sentences are perceived as statements that can be true or false, but not as valid 
or invalid; conditionals can be the premises or conclusions of arguments, but they are not 
arguments; the classical account of conditional sentences and arguments are both counter-
intuitive, but the first is widely unpopular, while the latter is reasonably influent.  
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 In this paper it is argued that this current view is incoherent, since there is a connection 
between the classical conception of logical consequence (formal implication) and material 
implication1. It is also argued that this connection suggests that material and formal implication 
are the same type of implication expressed in different modal ranges. Formal consequence is 
simply material consequence distributed across many worlds. The data that suggests that 
material and formal implication have many properties in common is presented in section 2. The 
idea that alternatives to the material implication face incoherencies is illustrated with an 
analysis of conditional-assertion theory and possible world theories in section 3. A unified view 
of implication in which conditional statements are interpreted as implication statements is 
presented in section 4. The counter-examples to classical argumentative forms are examined 
and, I hope, explained away in a principled manner in section 5. Section 6 tackles some known 
conditional puzzles such as conditional stand-offs and conditional embedding. Section 7 
concludes with observations about the far-reaching consequences of this approach to our 
understanding of logic. 
 
2. MATERIAL AND FORMAL IMPLICATION 
 The material implication A ⊃ B amounts to a claim that a premise A materially implies 
a conclusion B if, and only if, it is not the case that both A is true and B is false in a given world 
that is assumed as a parameter. This reference to a parameter world is justified by the fact that 
we can evaluate an assertion of material implication in other worlds beyond the actual. This is 
evidenced in possible world theories that always redirect us to the closest A-world to evaluate 
a conditional statement, but in this A-world the relation of implication between A and B is also 
material. In order to make sense of the classical use of material implication and differentiate it 
from its use in possible world theories, we can observe that in the second, but not in the first, 
the parameter world is always the closest one where A is true. The mention of a premise and a 
conclusion instead of the usual notions of antecedent and consequent is also intentional: since 
we are talking about interpreting conditionals as assertions of material implication, and since 
this is an implication relation in some special sense, the antecedent and consequence of a 
conditional should be interpreted as a premise and a conclusion of an argument, respectively. 
 There are reasons to accept a connection between the classical conception of logical 
consequence and material implication occurs because the unrestricted relation of logical 
consequence (the formal implication2), repeats the patterns of a restricted relation of logical 
consequence (the material implication). The only difference between the two is that in the first 
the relation of implication has a wider modal reach, so to speak. If the relation of A materially 
implying B is valid when it is not the case that A is true and B is false, then the relation of A 
formally implying B is valid when it is not the case that A is true and B is false in any possible 
world. In other words, the validity of formal implication will depend on how we interpret the 
validity of material implication, and vice versa. See the table below. 
 
1  I will adopt the notation where ‘→’ stands for natural language conditionals, and ‘⊃  ’stands for material 
implication until the section 4, where we adopt ‘m⊨’ to denote an assertion of material implication. This 
modification in the choice of symbols will emphasise that material implication expresses the same relation of ‘⊨’ 
in a restricted form. I will use capital letters such as A, B, C for both propositional and formula variables. For 
simplicity of exposition, I will not use quotes to highlight the use-mention distinction when there is no risk of 
confusion—the context will make it clear which one is being used.  
 
2 For the sake of simplicity, I will use ‘formal implication ’as synonymous with ‘the validity of an argumentative 
form’, ‘unrestricted relation of logical consequence’ and ‘arguments in natural language that carry an implicit 
claim to formal implication’. The context will make it clear in which sense the term is being used. This term is 
useful because it helps to emphasise the contrasts and similarities with material implication. It is also briefer than 
the long-winded ‘unrestricted relation of logical consequence’. 
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Strengthening the Antecedent (SA) Left Weakening (Monotonicity) (LW) 
A ⊃ B ⊨ (A&C) ⊃ B      if A ⊨ B, then A&C ⊨ B 
Exportation Deduction Theorem 
(A&B) ⊃ C ⊨ A ⊃ (B ⊃ C) if A&B ⊨ C, then A ⊨ B ⊃ C 
Hypothetical Syllogism (HS) Transitivity of Entailment (TE) 
A ⊃ B, B ⊃ C ⊨ A ⊃ C if A ⊨ B and B ⊨ C, then A ⊨ C 
Conditional Negation Condition Negation Proof 
      A ⊃ B ⇆ ¬(A&¬B)       A ⊨ B ⇆ ¬◇(A&¬B) 
Conditional Antisyllogism Principle of Antisyllogism 
(A&B) ⊃ C ⊨ (A&¬C) ⊃ ¬B if A&B ⊨ C, then A&¬C ⊨ ¬B 
Contraposition (CON) Contraposition Proof (CP) 
A ⊃ B ⇆ ¬B ⊃ ¬A A ⊨ B ⇆ ¬B ⊨ ¬A 
Or-to-If General Or-to-If 
A ⊃ B ⇆ ¬A∨B A ⊨ B ⇆ ⧠(¬A∨B) 
Disjunction Principle General Disjunction Principle 
(A&B) ⊃ C ⇆ A ⊃ (¬B∨C) A&B ⊨ C ⇆ A ⊨ ¬B∨C 
Antecedent Disjunction Introduction  Antecedent Disjunction Introduction Proof 
((A ⊃ B)&(C ⊃ B)) ⊨ ((A∨C) ⊃ B) if A ⊨ B and C ⊨ B, then (A∨C) ⊨ B 
Conjunctive Syllogism Conditional 
 
Conjunctive Syllogism  
 
(¬(A&B) & A) ⊃ ¬B ¬(A&B) & A ⊨ ¬B 
Limited Transitivity   Limited Transitivity Proof  
A ⊃ B, (A&B) ⊃ C ⊨ A ⊃ C if A ⊨ B and (A&B) ⊨ C, then A ⊨ C 
 
 Material and formal implication also have in common the fact that they are 
antisymmetric: from A ⊃ B it doesn’t follow B ⊃ A, and from A ⊨ B it doesn’t follow B ⊨ A; 
and they are both reflexive, since A ⊃ A and A ⊨ A are both valid. There are two degrees of 
implication here. In first degree we have the relation of material implication, which preserves 
the truth of the premise in a given world taken as a parameter. In the second degree we have a 
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relation of formal implication that ensures that the truth of the premises is preserved in every 
possible world. The important thing is that the same pattern of implication presented in first 
degree is repeated in the second degree.  
 Take for instance the relation between (TE) and (HS). The first states that if A formally 
implies B, and B formally implies C, then A formally implies C; while the later states that if A 
materially implies B, and B materially implies C, then A materially implies C. This means that 
(HS) can be considered as a restricted form of transitivity. Another example is the relation 
between (SA) and (LW). The first states that if A materially implies B, then the conjunction of 
A and C materially implies B; whereas the second states that if A formally implies B, then the 
conjunction of A and C formally implies B. Now consider the examples presented in the table 
below. 
  
In the case of (FPM), a material implication trivially holds because the antecedent is false in 
the world parameter, and in (ECQ), a formal implication trivially holds because the antecedent 
is false in every possible world. In (SPM), the material implication trivially holds because the 
consequent is true in the parameter world, whereas in (TV) the formal implication trivially 
holds because the conclusion is true in every possible world. In both examples the relations of 
formal implication mirror the behaviour of the relations of material implication, with the only 
difference that the first covers all possible worlds while the latter is bounded to a given 
parameter world. 
 The connection between (FPM) and (ECQ) can also be explained as follows: the 
conditional ‘If A, then B’ is synonymous with ‘if A is true, then B is true’. Now suppose that A 
is false, and the truth of A is incompatible with the truth of B. Because of the incompatibility I 
decide to abandon the conditional and ignore that A is false. But this would amount to accept 
that the following conditional is false: ‘if A is true and false, then B is true’. So, the denial of 
(FPM) would amount to the denial of (ECQ). The connection between (FPM) and (ECQ) can 
also be explained as follows: when A → B is asserted under the assumption of ¬A, what is 
actually being asserted is (¬A&A) → B, which should be interpreted as saying that any 
consequent is materially implied by the conjunction of two inconsistent antecedents (Russell, 
1970, p. 136). We can also explain this as follows: from (FPM) we have ¬A → (A → B), which 
by importation amounts to (¬A&A) → B.  
 Thinking in similar lines shows that (SPM) is also connected with conjunction 
elimination. If a material implication it is motivated by a true consequent, then it has the truth 
of this consequent implicit in its antecedent. The assertion of A → B under the assumption of 
B should be interpreted as B → (A → B), which by importation leads us to (B&A) → B, which 
means that a consequent is materially implied by its combination with its antecedent (Ceniza, 
1988, p. 511). So now we can’t deny (SPM) without denying conjunction elimination either. 
The relation between (SPM) and (TV) can established as follows: 
 
First Paradox of Material Implication (FPM) Ex Contradictione Quodlibet (ECQ) 
¬A ⊨ A ⊃ B ¬◇A, then ¬◇A ⊨ B 
Second Paradox of Material Implication (SPM) Trivial Validity (TV) 
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1. B → (A → B)     inferential justification  
2. (A&B) → B        1, importation 
3. ¬(A&B) ∨ B        2, or-to-if 
4. (¬A∨¬B) ∨ B      3, & 
5. ¬A∨(¬B ∨ B)      4, associativity 
6. A → (¬B ∨ B)    5, or-to-if 
 
 This means that denying that ‘if A and B are true, then B is true’ leads to the negation 
of ‘if A is true, then B is true or false’. 
 Another relevant argument was advanced by Lee Archie (1979). He defended that if 
any truth values are consistently assigned to a natural language conditional to which modus 
ponens (MP) and modus tollens (MT) are valid argumentative forms, and affirming the 
consequent is an invalid argumentative form, this conditional would have the same truth 
conditions of a material implication. His argument relies on circumstance surveyors and some 
relatively uncontroversial assumptions: when the antecedent of a conditional is true and the 
consequent is false, the conditional is false; (MP) and (MT) have at least one substitution 
instance with true premises and a  true conclusion; affirming the consequent have at least one 
substitution instance with true premises and a false conclusion; a conditional is truth-functional 
without any suppositions concerning the assignment of its truth values. This conclusion is in 
agreement with our view. There is no consistent attribution of truth values to a conditional 
different from material implication that can satisfy (MP), (MT), and invalidate affirming the 
consequent, for the simple reason that material and formal implication express the same 
properties in different modal ranges3.  
 Formal implication and material implication are tied in such a fundamental manner that 
our intuitions, arguments and hypotheses about the former should be translated in intuitions, 
arguments and hypotheses about the latter. This relation represents a bridge between formal 
implication and conditionals. This connection is of the most importance because conditional 
logic experts tend to be very critical of the material implication while simultaneously accepting 
the classical notion of formal implication. They will be inclined to accept argumentative forms 
such as (ECQ) and (TV) at the same time they reject (FPM) and (SPM). This differential 
treatment probably occurs because the classical notion of formal implication is fairly simple 
and intuitive, whereas the material implication is still poorly understood given its close ties to 
natural language and it is susceptible to a wide variety of biases that muddle our perception of 
the issue and clouds our understanding4. 
 
3. ALTERNATIVE NOTIONS OF LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE 
 The relationship between material and formal implication suggests that there should be 
also a connection between the notion of logical consequence and the truth conditions of a 
conditional in any given logical system. After all, conditional sentences simply express the 
 
3 It is arguable that Archie’s argument can be extended to many-valued logics. I will leave this exercise to the 
reader. This suggests that even if we would not believe in bivalence and in the classical negation operator, we 
would still have good reasons to accept that natural language conditionals and the material implication share truth 
conditions. 
4 For different explanations of the supposed biases see Ajdukiewicz (1956), Allott & Uchida (2009a; 2009b), 
Clark (1971), Hanson (1991), Lewis (1976), Grice (1989), Jackson (1987, 2006), Mellor (1993), Noh (1998); 
Rieger (2006; 2013); Smith (1983), Smith & Smith (1988), and Silva (2017). 
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properties of logical consequence in a narrower modal scope. This implies that we need to posit 
different conceptions of logical consequence that are consistent with different theories of 
conditionals in order to evaluate their relative merits. As a pilot study of this research program, 
we evaluate two new notions of logical consequence motivated by conditional-assertion theory 
and possible world theories. Those alternatives can be compared unfavourably with the 
classical conception of logical consequence.  
 According to possible world theories, A → B is true iff either B is true in the closest A-
world, or A is impossible. If B is false in the closest A-world, the conditional is false (Stalnaker, 
1975). David Lewis (1973) offers a distinct version inspired by the same idea. The difference 
in this case is that A → B is true if, and only if, in every possible A-world that is as closest to 
the actual world as it is allowed by the truth of A, B is true. There are many other possible 
worlds semantics inspired on the same idea—see Davis (1979). These details and their subtle 
differences don’t impact on my argumentation, since they all face the same difficulties 
associated with their pre-theoretic intuitions. From here on I will take Stalnaker’s semantics as 
default and refer it as vanilla possible world semantics or simply possible world account. The 
possible world account denies the following argumentative forms:  
• (SA), for B can be true in the closest A-world, but false in the closest A&C-world;  
 
• (HS), for even if B is true in the closest A-world, and C is true in the closest B-world, 
C can still be false in the closest A-world; 
 
• (CON), because B can be true in the closest A-world, while ¬A is false in the closest 
¬B-world; 
 
• (FPM), since B could be false in the closest A-world even if ¬A is true in the actual 
world; 
 
• (SPM), given that B could be false in the closest A-world even if B is true in the actual 
world. 
 
 The consequence of this departure from material implication is the denial of the 
following metalogical principles: 
 
• (LW): if a relation of material implication cannot be monotonic, neither should be a 
relation of formal implication; 
 
• (TE): if the relations of material implication in the hypothetical syllogism are not 
transitive, neither are the relations of formal implication in an argumentative form; 
 
• (CP): if the falsity of the conclusion (i.e., the consequent) in a material implication 
relation does not imply the falsity of the premise (i.e., the antecedent), then the falsity 
of a conclusion in a formal implication does not imply the falsity of the premise; 
 
• (ECQ): if a material implication does not follow trivially from a false premise (i.e., 
the antecedent), then a formal implication will not follow trivially from a 
contradictory premise; 
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• (TV): if a material implication does not follow trivially from a true conclusion (i.e., 
the consequent), then a formal implication will not follow trivially from a necessary 
conclusion. 
 
 I’m not sure that most people would be willing to adopt such revisionist consequences 
based on criticisms to the material implication, but that’s the price they will have to pay for the 
sake of coherence. There is no doubt that metalogical principles such as (LW), (TE) and (CP) 
represent a fundamental aspect of any believable notion of logical consequence. (ECQ) and 
(TV) are more controversial and the proponent of the possible world account could argue that 
denying (ECQ) is a consequence that should be seen as a bonus and not a hindrance. After all, 
we already have system of paraconsistent logics specifically crafted to deal with contradictions 
in a way that prevents them from implying anything. But the reason why this answer is 
unconvincing in this case is that the possible world account also has its own device of triviality 
that is reminiscent of (ECQ), namely, that A → B is true when A is impossible. This is not 
consistent with the type of thinking we would expect from the denial of (ECQ). Besides, it 
would not be a stretch to suggest that most people will accept them.  
 One obvious reply to my criticism is that possible world theories can be modified to 
accommodate counterpossible conditionals and impossible worlds5. Some proposal along these 
lines would allow us to refuse both (FPM) and (ECQ). The reason why I don’t consider these 
proposals promising is that they are too timid and half-hearted to be presented as a proper full-
fledged alternative to the material implication in their own right. For example, if (FPM) and 
(ECQ) are abandoned, (SPM) and (TV) should be abandoned too. After all, they are also 
examples of trivial validity in material and formal guises. But that is not the case, which suggest 
that the intuitions that motivate these reconstructions involve theoretical purposes that are alien 
to the whole enterprise and probably involve some basic misconception about the nature of 
conditionals and arguments in general. Never mind the fact that these proposals would still 
acknowledge the denials of (LW), (TE) and (CP), which simply defy belief.  
 One could argue that metalogical principles such as (SA), (HS) and (CON) are not 
inconsistent with the possible world account after all. They only seem inconsistent with the 
theory if we make an illicit context shift in the evaluation of the principles. If the context is 
maintained fixed, those principles will turn out true in the possible world account (Brogaard & 
Salerno, 2008). While it is undeniable that avoiding contextual fallacies remains a fundamental 
tenet of semantics, this solution doesn’t have its intended effect in regard to the possible world 
account for two reasons. First, if we follow this stricture through, it will imply that (FPM) and 
(SPM) are true principles as well (Silva, 2017). This result would undermine the whole reason 
for a possible world account in the first place. Second, as Cross (2011) so eloquently put it, 
there is no such thing as a contextual fallacy as far as the possible world system is concerned. 
The contextual fallacy is embedded in the very truth conditions of the logic system, which was 
motivated by modal intuitions that rely on context shifting. So, there is no way to correct it by 
simply adding further restrictions in the evaluation of conditionals. 
 Now, let’s move on to conditional-assertion theories. They state that if B is an assertive 
act, A → B is used to conditionally assert that B given A6. One of the most surprisingly features 
 
5 See, for example, Sorensen (1996), Nolan (1997), and Zalta (1997). 
6 Some of the main proponents of the theory are Appiah (1985), Edgington (1986, 1995), Barker (1995), Woods 
(1997); DeRose (1999) and DeRose & Grandy (1999). One could object that I’m ignoring conditional-assertion 
theories in its propositional version. These theories state that A → B is true when A and B are both true; false when 
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of conditional-assertion theory is its non-propositional requirement. The theory states that A → 
B is just a conditional act of B given A. Thus, it is not a proposition with truth values, much 
less a connective that combines two propositions to produce an additional proposition whose 
truth values are determined by its propositional constituents (DeRose & Grandy, 1999, p. 407). 
This puts conditionals in an entirely new light. Instead of being seen as static truth-functions, 
conditionals are now portrayed as action movements in natural language. Conditional-assertion 
theories will deny the following metalogical principles:  
 
• (SA): one could be willing to assert B given the assumption of A, but not willing to 
assert B under the assumption of A&C;  
 
• (HS): one could be willing to assert B under the assumption of A, or willing to assert 
C under the assumption of B, but not willing to assert C under the assumption of A; 
 
• (CON): one could be willing to assert B given the assumption of A, but still reject the 
assertion of ¬A given the assumption of ¬B; 
 
• (FPM): from ¬A nothing follows about whether one would be willing to assert B 
given the hypothetical acceptance of A; 
 
• (SPM): from B nothing follows about whether one would be willing to assert B given 
the hypothetical acceptance of A. 
 
 This means that just as the possible world account, conditional assertion theories are 
also inconsistent with (LW), (TE), (CP), (ECQ) and (TV), and would have to endorse a notion 
of logical consequence that has no resemblance with anything we have in mind as far as the 
subject goes. It is important to notice that not every proponent of the theory will accept this 
interpretation. Edgington (1995, p. 254), who is known for being the main proponent of this 
theory, objects that the invalidity of (HS) only seems plausible due to an illicit context shift. In 
the context where both premises A → B and B → C reflected acts of conditional assertion; it 
would also be a context where A → C would be an act of conditional assertion. But this type 
of answer is inadequate because even if one would be willing to make an act of conditional 
assertion, it does not follow that she did make an act of conditional assertion. This concession 
is also inadequate because a speaker may not anticipate the conclusions of her previous 
assertion commitments. The other problem is that even if we could demand consistency for 
arguers with a fixed context requirement, this would put in doubt the whole conditional 
assertion theory enterprise, since the counter-examples to the material implication will also be 
disarmed with a fixed context (Silva, 2017, p. 4).     
 The relationship between the classical notion of logical consequence and the material 
implication only occurs if the latter is a form of implication in its own right. This seemingly 
innocuous observation presents another challenge for conditional assertion-theories, since in 
 
A is true and B is false; and has no truth value when A is false, regardless of B’s truth value. In other words, if A 
is false, A → B express no proposition. See Jeffrey (1963); Manor (1974) and McDermott (1996). The reason why 
I don’t consider these views as versions of conditional-assertion theory is that this line of reasoning doesn’t 
interpret conditionals as conditional speech acts, but as categorical assertions that are null when the antecedent is 
false. 
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their analysis of conditional sentences they are not analysed as a sort of implication, but as a 
conditional assertion act.  
 What is curious is that despite their many alleged differences, possible world and 
conditional assertion theories end up facing similar difficulties. The reason lies in the shared 
intuition that motivated each theory: the Ramsey’s test. The test states that we accept A → B 
if, and only if, after the hypothetical addition of A to our belief system, and after making the 
required adjustments to maintain consistency without modifying the hypothetical belief in A, 
we would be willing to accept B (Stalnaker, 1968, p. 102)7. Conditional assertion theories are 
analogous to the Ramsey’s test as follows: the theory predicts that if B is an assertive act, A → 
B is synonymous with the willingness to assert B after the hypothetical addition of A to our 
belief system, and corresponding adjustments to maintain consistency without modifying the 
hypothetical belief in A (Edgington, 2014, sec. 3.1). It is also common knowledge that possible 
world accounts were initially designed as an ontological analogue of Ramsey’s test: the closest 
A-world is the equivalent to the addition of A to our belief system after making the required 
adjustments to maintain consistency without abandoning the belief in A (Stalnaker, 1968, p. 
102). 
 It could objected that any relation between material and formal implication in a classical 
logic system shouldn’t be indicative of any dependence between the truth conditions of 
conditionals and the explanation of logical consequence in alternative systems. After all, this 
relationship just reflects the patterns of one system among many. To insist on this pattern as a 
universal restriction would ensue accusations of logical provincialism, if not outright 
dogmatism. The reason why this objection is wrong headed is that alternative logic systems all 
start as a departure of classical logic. This is especially the case for conditional logics and 
theories of conditionals, which always target the material implication with criticisms and offer 
tailor-made alternatives to fix these counter-intuitive features. But if conditionals were 
assertions of implication to begin with, most of these alternatives are poorly motivated from 
the start.  
 
4. THE NATURE OF LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE 
Suppose one asserts that a premise A implies a conclusion B. This corresponds to the assertion 
of a conditional, ‘If A, then B’. Let us assume you believe that A implies B only in relation to 
one world w1. This means that you believe it is not the case that A is true and B is false in w1. 
This description encapsulates the modal range assumed in most conditionals used in daily life. 
If I say, ‘If John left, he went to the supermarket’, I assume that it is not the case that John left 
but went somewhere else. Otherwise, I remain uncorrected. If this conditional is true, the 
premise implies the conclusion. This is a material implication.   
 The ‘if ’part in the conditional is also known as its antecedent, and what is expressed 
after ‘then ’is the consequent. According to a popular view influenced by Quine (1961, p. 323; 
1964, p. 196), to interpret conditionals as claims to implication is to commit the use-mention 
fallacy in which the antecedent and consequent are mentioned as the premise and conclusion 
of an implication relation. Instead, genuine conditionals do not mention statements, but use 
them to express a relation between facts and objects in the world. This popular view is baseless 
though. When a conditional is asserted, it’s the whole proposition that is asserted, and not its 
antecedent and consequent. The assertion of a conditional, then, is made as a statement about 
a relation between the propositions expressed by the antecedent and consequent. In other 
 
7 This is the modified and more widely discussed formulation of the test. The original idea and formulation can 
be found in Ramsey (1929, p. 143). 
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words, the antecedent and consequent are mentioned, not used. The speaker is stating that the 
consequent follows from the antecedent. So, the interpretation of conditionals as claims to 
implication is still the correct one.  
 In the example above you believe that A implies B only relatively to one world w1. But, 
depending on the subject at hand, you could assume that A implies B in all possible worlds. In 
this interpretation, it is not the case that A is true and B is false in any possible world. In this 
case we say that, in this interpretation, A formally implies B. Other similar expressions that can 
be used here are ‘A strictly implies B’, ‘A entails B ’or ‘B is a logical consequence of A’. The 
reference to ‘formally implies ’is not an accident. When A implies B in all possible worlds, it 
is because it involves some necessity that can be recognised or reinterpreted in terms that are 
exclusively due to formal terms. 
 Formal implication is an unrestricted material implication, i.e., a material implication 
under the scope of a necessity operator. When A formally implies B, A also materially implies 
B in any possible world. In fact, what we have here is a relation of implication that can admit 
different degrees of modal reach. When it is extended to all possible worlds, we say the relation 
of implication is formal, but when is restricted to a given world, we call it material—see the 
image below. 
 
Now material implication is satisfied in at least one possible world, while formal 
implication extends over all possible worlds. How about the implication relations in between? 
Their range will vary according to the arguer’s beliefs about the subject matter. If we do not 
expect physical truths to be metaphysically necessary, we will place them in the intermediary 
range between material and formal implication—see the figure 2 below. This is not written in 
stone and it does not have a pre-existent nature. The range of implication will be dependent on 
the arguer’s beliefs. The only thing that is objective is that no implication is valid if it fails in 
its range. If it is formal, it will fail if there is a possible world where the premise is true and the 
conclusion is false. If it is material, it will fail in case the premise is true and the conclusion is 
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One could insist in a third option, namely, a variably strict implication whose range 
varies according to the closest worlds in which the premise is true. The variable strict 
implication would then be ‘valid ’if the conclusion is true in the closest worlds (in the sense of 
most similar to the actual world) where the premise is true. You could in principle debate what 
should be our criteria of similarity. There is a distinct possibility that we will not be able to tell 
in certain cases if the claim to variable implication is true or not. There are a couple reasons to 
avoid this approach. First, this idea makes the relation of implication dependent on a check 
involving hypothetical assumptions about the truth of the premise. This incorporates an element 
that is completely foreign to the notion of implication, which intuitively will hold even if the 
premise is false. Second, it gives the wrong answer in some obvious examples, e.g., when I 
say, ‘If John is telling the truth, I’m more intelligent than Barcan Marcus’, I’m making a claim 
to implication that can be obviously satisfied in the material range, but will be always invalid 
in the variable one. The conclusion is false in all the closest worlds where the premise is true, 
but that’s because it’s a claim to a material implication made under the assumption that the 
premise is false in order to demonstrate that the premise is false by a reductio of sorts. This 
type of blunder occurs with variable implication because it is a notion motivated by intuitions 
associated with the use of (MP). They are tilted in the direction of the premise being true 
because that is what occurs when you are employing a conditional in a (MP). Thus, if we want 
proper implication variation, it will be different ranges of necessitation. The closest worlds 
where the premises are true do not need to factor in it.   
 So, we have claims to implication. These claims will be true if the corresponding truth-
value combinations about the premise(s) and conclusion hold. In order to determine if these 
combinations are satisfied, we need to consider the worlds in which they are supposed to hold. 
This modal range is determined by the proponent of the implication and her beliefs on the 
subject. We can give different names to implication relations according to their modal range. 
The intrusion of epistemic elements is allowed when they involve the demarcation of modal 
ranges, but what happens in each range is the necessitation of the truth of the conclusion given 
the truth of the premises. The implication is valid when the truth of the premises necessitates 
the truth of the conclusion relatively to a certain range. In a material implication, the truth of 
the premises necessitates the truth of the conclusion in relation to a parameter world, while in 
a formal implication the truth of the premises necessitates the truth of the conclusion tout court. 
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 Conditional statements express implication statements, so they can also be interpreted 
as arguments in their own right. Notice that once we have decided to interpret conditionals as 
implication statements, our conceptual habits will change significantly and we will need to 
revise our baby logic conventions. For instance, the talk about (HS) as an argumentative form 
commits a category mistake. The reason is that it does not make sense to talk about an 
argumentative form that contains two implication statements as premises and another one as a 
conclusion, since real people do not make arguments where the premises are arguments 
themselves. Rather, (HS) should be interpreted as a metalogical principle about the properties 
of implication involving three implication statements. The received view of logic is incorrect, 
since the supposed argumentative forms are actually metalogical statements about the 
properties of implication. In fact, they are nothing more than expressions of these properties.  
 Logic offers us an explanation of the nature of implication. This insight allows us to 
make a classification of metalogical principles, and each will express a different property of 
implication. (MP) express the property of reflexivity, which is an uninteresting property. This 
can be show with general conditional proof (GCP), the principle that states that if two premises 
formally imply a conclusion, then one of these premises will formally imply that the other 
premise materially implies the conclusion. The demonstration is as follows: 
 
Prem (1) A m⊨ B, A ⊨ B (MP) 
1 (2) (A m⊨ B) ⊨ (A m⊨ B) 1, (GCP) 
 
 (MP) is then the claim that A m⊨ B implies itself, i.e., is the property of reflexivity. It’s 
symptomatic that some authors tried to refute (MP) because this would amount to deny that A 
m⊨ B formally implies itself. Now let’s consider (MT), which can be expressed as A m⊨ B, ¬B 
⊨ ¬A. This amounts to accept that from a material implication and the denial of its conclusion 
it follows the denial of its premise. This is exactly the same meaning conveyed by (CON). 
Consider the following inference using (MT) and (GCP): 
 
Prem (1) A m⊨ B, ¬B ⊨ ¬A (MT) 
1 (2) (A m⊨ B)  ⊨ (¬B m⊨ ¬A) 1, (GCP) 
 
 The acceptance of (MT) leads us to (CON), which is nothing more than the claim that 
if a premise materially implies the conclusion, then the denial of the conclusion leads to the 
denial of the premise. It’s a simple property of material implication.  
 (SA) represents the monotonic aspect of material implication. If it is accepted that a 
premise materially implies a conclusion, then the inclusion of another premise will not defeat 
this claim, so we have (A1 m⊨ B) ⊨ (A1&A2 m⊨ B). The other metalogical principles will follow 
through in seamless fashion. (HS) can be expressed as (A m⊨ B1), (B1 m⊨ B2) ⊨ (A m⊨ B2), and 
represents the transitivity of material implication. Conditional negation (CN) can be expressed 
as ¬(A m⊨ B) ⊨ A&¬B and express what follows from the invalidity of a material implication, 
and so on. 
 The same patterns repeat themselves with formal implication. (SA) has an unrestricted 
cousin in (LW), namely, that if A1 ⊨ B then A1&A2 ⊨ B. (HS) has an unrestricted parallel in 
transitivity of entailment, which is exactly the same logical form now with formal implication 
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instead of material implication, (A ⊨ B1), (B1 ⊨ B2) ⊨ (A ⊨ B2). The unrestricted version of 
(CN) can be expressed as ¬(A ⊨ B) ⊨ ◇(A&¬B), and so on.  
 The supposed tautological character of valid deductive arguments is another perplexing 
notion that we created due to the excessive importance we attribute to pedagogical tools like 
(MP). Indeed, in a (MP) we are supposed to start with a claim to an implication statement, 
proceed to state the premise of this implication statement and then infer the conclusion already 
contained in the initial statement. But if arguments aim to convince the audience, the premises 
need to be more plausible than the conclusion, and an implication statement cannot be more 
plausible than the conclusion it already contains. This goes against the very aim of 
argumentation. 
 But while the admission that argumentative forms with conditionals are actually 
metalogical principles can reduce the logical toolbox, one could object that it still lets unscathed 
numerous valid argumentative forms, e.g., De Morgan’s laws, conjunction elimination, 
conjunctive syllogism, double negation and disjunction introduction. But since conditionals are 
logically equivalent to disjunction statements, and conditionals are ultimately claims to 
implication, then claims to implication are logically equivalent to disjunction statements. 
Therefore, the supposed argumentative forms involving disjunction statements are   also 
metalogical principles about the properties of implication. Thus, a schema such as disjunction 
introduction is ‘valid’ because it is a metalogical principle that express a property of inclusive 
disjunctions. This has nothing to do with real world argumentation and shouldn’t be taught as 
if it was a useful guide to it. If formal logic were a useful guide to argumentation, the only 
thing that would be needed in order to demonstrate a conclusion is to retroactively infer a 
known, but trivial premise that has the same truth-conditions of the conclusion.   
 Perhaps the most important consequence of the previous statements is that we can’t 
have a formal demonstration of validity in general. Let’s consider an obvious example of 
validity, such as (MP). It is undeniable that if the argument presented as a premise is valid, and 
the second premise that states the premise of this argument is true, then the conclusion of the 
argument presented in the premise must be true. But this assurance will confirm nothing of 
substance about whether the initial argument, the ‘premise’, was valid or not. The conclusion 
is merely conditional: if the argument is valid and the ‘second premise’ is true, the conclusion 
is true. But this is just a reinstatement of the nature of validity. It doesn’t guide us to the validity 
of real-world arguments.  
 The implication premise in a (MP) is not circular because it states that it is not the case 
that A is true and B is false in a given modal range, and that these truth values can be ascertained 
in an independent manner. But if the purposed implication claim is substantial, the truth values 
of A and B will be controversial and we will have to consider independent reasons and possibly 
other implication statements to decide whether A implies B or not. Let’s say that the implication 
statement is ‘If the Taniyama–Shimura conjecture is true, then Fermat’s last theorem is true’. 
The justification for such statement involves hundreds of additional assumptions and at least a 
few dozen additional theorems. The truth of this conjecture was unknown until Andrew Wiles 
came along. It is certainly not something whose validity can be ascertained by a circumstance 
surveyor. What can be shown by using such textbook techniques, however, is that if this 
statement is valid, you can infer the truth of its conclusion from its premise, but this result is 
uninteresting and doesn’t help us in our attempts to gain more knowledge. 
 The circularity of metalogical principles is also evidenced in the use of (CON), which 
allows us to move from a premise that states that A materially implies B to a conclusion that 
states that ¬B materially implies ¬A. Where is the justification to accept that A materially 
implies B in the first place? The fact that it is not the case that A is true and B is false. How do 
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I know that? I need to check in the real world to determine whether this truth value combination 
is satisfied or not. But real-life implication statements are not so obvious that you can tell the 
truth value of their propositional components in advance. So, you will have to rely on indirect 
evidence and other implication statements in order to get to this conclusion. This is not 
something that can be achieved by the calculus of truth values alone. The same can be said 
about (MT), (HS) and (SA). Their logical form will assure you that the conclusion is valid if 
the premise is valid, but that doesn’t provide any formal guarantees that the premise was valid 
in the first place. It is assumptions in, assumptions out. The conclusion is just as good as the 
information you inserted in the premises in the first place.  
 One potential misunderstanding here is assuming that logic can be useful as an 
epistemic guide to find valid implication in the real world, since it encapsulates the nature of 
valid implication. It is a non-sequitur and it is similar to the trap of confusing truth conditions 
with the criteria of truth. Truth conditions have logical significance for they determine the 
conditions in which a proposition is true or false, but criteria of truth only have epistemic 
significance because they are standards used in contexts of imperfect information to distinguish 
whether a given proposition is true or false, i.e., in contexts where the only evidence available 
to assess the relevant proposition is intensional. Neither truth conditions provide criteria of 
truth, nor a concept of implication provides criteria of validity.  
 The circularity of metalogical statements explains why the conclusion of a valid 
deductive argument appears to be contained in its premises in some trivial sense. If your notion 
of implication is determined by an innocuous metalogical observation about the properties of 
implication, then valid deductive arguments will be seen as merely tautological. Things don’t 
work that way in the real world. In order to ascertain whether a particular deductive argument 
is valid or not, we need to consider the reasons that support such statement. That occurs because 
the elements that allow you to assess the validity of a deductive argument are the same devices 
that allow you to build a deductive argument. That is, you know that a deductive argument is 
valid in a non-trivial way by considering whether the claim to a conceptual connection between 
the premises and the conclusion is true. 
 That also explains why experts in other areas will be able to carry on doing their 
cognitive business without the hassle of reading logic textbooks; and why nobody excepts 
philosophers know what is a (MP) and why real-life deductive arguments are not tautological. 
The ability to judge the merits of a claim to implication are specific in nature and demand 
understanding of the subject matter involved in the allegations. A body of knowledge and 
conceptual understanding cannot be moved around and automatically inserted in different 
domains like a pile of books is inserted on an empty shelf. We are not able to determine the 
validity or invalidity of a deductive argument in any domain of our choice, irrespectively of 
whether we have any knowledge about the subject or not. That would require a single method 
that could be applied to any domain and all it would require of us is taking a mere logic class 
and doing some exercises on a piece of paper. It would trivialize all deductive enterprises so 
that they could fit in our preconceived notions. 
 Naturally, one can learn many interesting things about the nature of implication itself. 
The metalogical statements express properties that are interdependent and assure us that any 
alternative logical system is severely limited in scope. If an alternative notion of implication 
violates (HS), it must also violate (TE) and (MP); the refusal of (CN) implies a denial of (MT) 
and (CON), and the abandonment of (SA) violates monotonicity and (HS), and so on. But 
beyond that, these properties will either presuppose the validity of the target implication used 
as a source, or they will be trivial. Consequently, these principles should not be confused with 
real-life argumentative forms or an epistemic guide to real-life argumentation, which is too 
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complex and dependent on content to be identified exclusively by formal means. Logic is the 
science of logical consequence, but paradoxically this means that it cannot help us find 
meaningful logical consequence.  
 
5. PUTTING COUNTEREXAMPLES TO REST 
The perspective defended in this article allows us to explain the counter-examples against 
classical metalogical principles in a consequential manner. Let’s consider the (FPM). One 
apparent counterexample to this principle is ‘Some John did not drink poison. Therefore, if 
John drinks poison, it will be good for his health’. Intuitively, the premise can be true, while 
the subsequent implication statement is false. But the first paradox claims that that in every 
possible world in which ¬A is true, A implies B in that parameter world. The implication 
statement seems false if we conceive a world where A is true, but this intuition ignores that the 
world parameters in this case is a world where A is false, not true. 
The (SPM) also has counter-intuitive instances such as ‘The match will not be cancelled. 
Therefore, if the players broke their legs, the match will not be cancelled. ’This principle claims 
that that in every possible world in which B is true, A implies B in that parameter world. The 
apparent counter-example only seems plausible if we ignore that this claim to implication is 
restricted to parameter worlds in which B is true. Since in those worlds the match is not 
cancelled, the assumption that the players broke their legs is also false. Once again, the contrary 
intuition is motivated by a modal illusion and poor reasoning: what seems obvious results from 
an illicit shift in the parameter world.  
 It was observed that (SA) encapsulates the monotonic aspect of material implication. 
Basically, it is a claim that any accepted implication statement should be robust given new 
information. This goes against the prevalent notion that most implication statements are non-
monotonic, since many of the past arguments were abandoned by their proponents after new 
discoveries. But it must be observed that no one advances an argument predicated on the notion 
that is going to be abandoned. Instead, one argues for an argument given the expectation that 
will be resilient upon new discoveries. If the argument doesn’t meet this requirement, it is going 
to be abandoned.  
 Now (SA) faces the following counter-example: ‘If the match is struck it will light. 
Therefore, if the match is struck and it is held under water, it will light’. In order to understand 
what is wrong with this counter-example, remember that what (SA) really means is that if an 
implication statement is true, it will remain true given the additional of new information. 
Conversely, if a strengthened implication statement turns out to be false, is because the original 
statement was never true in the first place. 
 This is precisely what happens in the supposed counterexample. There are no 
circumstances where ‘If the match is struck it will light’ is valid given the addition of the 
premise that the match is held under water. The temptation is to assume that the initial statement 
can be accepted, while the strengthened claim to material implication must be discarded. But 
this can only occur if we evaluate them in different contexts, thus committing a contextual 
fallacy. 
  Another classical principle that has counter-intuitive instances is (CON). Take for 
instance ‘If it rains tomorrow there will not be a terrific cloudburst. Therefore, if there is a 
terrific cloudburst tomorrow it will not rain’ (Adams, 1975, p. 15). Let’s call the first and 
second implication statements S1 and S2, respectively. S2 only seems false if we consider a 
parameter world where its premise is true, but S1 is only true in a parameter world where this 
premise of S2 is false. Thus, we can’t have an evaluation in which S1 is true and S2 false if 
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they involve the same parameter worlds.  
  Now consider the following counter-example to (HS): ‘If Brown wins the election, 
Smith will retire to private life. If Smith dies before the election, Brown will win it. Therefore, 
if Smith dies before the election, then he will retire to private life.’ Let’s call each implication 
statement S1*, S2* and S3*, respectively. Intuitively, one could plausibly accept both S1* and 
S2*, but reject S3*. It is absurd to suppose that Smith could decide to retire after he died 
(Adams, 1965, p. 166). 
The counterexample does not work, however, since the implication statements are not 
evaluated in the same parameter world. Suppose that S3* is false, i.e., that it has a true premise 
and a false conclusion. In this case, Smith will not be able to retire, because he will die before 
the election takes place. S1* has a false conclusion and S2* has a true premise. It remains to 
be seen whether Brown will win the election in this context. If he does, S1* will have a true 
premise and a false conclusion, and S2* must be true, since the premise and the conclusion are 
true. Therefore, at least one of S1* and S2* will be false. There is no counterexample. 
 Now let’s tackle (CN). This principle faces counter-intuitive instances such as the 
following: ‘It is not the case that if God exists then the prayers of evil men will be answered. 
Therefore, God exists and the prayers of evil men will not be answered’ (Stevenson, 1970, p. 
28). Thus, from the negation of a simple conditional, I can prove that God exists. This is 
implausible, because someone could refuse the conditional based on assumptions about the 
moral dispositions of God even if she does not believe in the existence of God.  
 Let’s that a person believes that God’s moral dispositions are essentially inconsistent 
with answering the prayers of evil men. The conditional then is interpreted as ‘There is no 
possible world in which God exists but the prayers of evil men are not answered’, which can 
be accepted without any commitment to the truth-values of either its premise or conclusion in 
the actual world. In other words, the counter-example is motivated by a simple mistake. It 
confuses a material implication statement, which is restricted to a parameter world, with a 
formal implication statement, which is an unrestricted material implication that extends over 
many worlds. This is perfectly normal if we understand that conditionals are implication 
statements that can admit different modal ranges. 
 
6. SOLVING CONDITIONAL PUZZLES 
There is a long list of conditional puzzles presented in the literature. It includes 
conditional stand offs, the triviality results, conditional embedding and the Apartheid thesis, to 
name just a few. These enigmas have defied philosophers for decades and stirred dozens of 
ingenuous solutions as a result. In this section I offer a new way to address these conditional 
puzzles. Let’s start with conditional stand offs. In very loose terms, a conditional stand-off 
occurs when one individual has grounds to accept a conditional, while another has equally 
compelling grounds to accept what seems to be the same conditional with a negated 
consequent. If conditionals have truth conditions, they cannot both be true, because they seem 
contradictory. The reasoning then is that in order for one of the conditionals to be false, 
someone would have to make a mistake about the facts of the case. However, both individuals 
have perfect good reasons to accept each conditional. If none of them is making a mistake, 
none of them is saying something false. Therefore, conditionals have no truth conditions. This 
puzzle was presented by Gibbard (1981, pp. 226–32) in the following example: 
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Sly Pete and Mr. Stone are playing poker on a Mississippi riverboat. It is now up to Pete to call 
or fold. My henchman Zack sees Stone's hand, which is quite good, and signals its content to 
Pete. My henchman Jack sees both hands, and sees that Pete's hand is rather low, so that Stone's 
is the winning hand. At this point, the room is cleared. (…) Zack knows that Pete knew Stone's 
hand. He can thus appropriately assert ‘If Pete called, he won.’ Jack knows that Pete held the 
losing hand, and thus can appropriately assert ‘If Pete called, he lost.’ From this, we can see 
that neither is asserting anything false. 
 
 There is a caveat with this example though. It is arguable that the example is not really 
symmetric because Jack has better reasons to justify his belief than Zack. This led to attempts 
to offer new stand-off examples which ensured perfect symmetry:  
 
In a game, (1) all red square cards are worth 10 points, and (2) all large square cards are worth 
nothing. X caught a glimpse as Z picked a card and saw that it was red. Knowing (1), he believes 
‘If Z picked a square card, it’s worth 10 points’. Y, seeing it bulging under Z’s jacket, where Z 
is keeping it out of view, knows it’s large. Knowing (2), he believes ‘If Z picked a square card, 
it’s worth nothing’ (Edgington, 1995, p. 294). 
 
 The obvious response is that one can have epistemic bad luck even if she hadn’t done 
nothing. You can ‘do your job’ as an epistemic agent and still be wrong if the context is 
somewhat averse to your belief justification process. Moreover, if both statements are 
interpreted as implication statements, they can both be correct if their common premises turn 
out to be false, i.e., if Z didn’t pick a square card. Otherwise, notwithstanding X and Y good 
epistemic practices, one of the conditionals will have a true premise and a false conclusion, and 
one of them will be mistaken.  
 The Apartheid thesis is another perplexing issue that defied conditional experts for 
decades. It states that indicative and subjunctive conditionals have different truth conditions. 
One of the main arguments that have been presented to support this thesis are the Adam pairs. 
Consider the following pair of conditionals:  
 
 (1) If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, someone else did.  
 (2) If Oswald had not killed Kennedy, someone else would have.  
 
 Intuitively, these conditionals have different truth conditions. After all, in order to 
accept (1) is enough to know that Kennedy was killed by someone, but to accept (2) is necessary 
to assume a conspiracy theory regarding its murder (Lewis, 1973, p. 3)8. 
 The intuition that supports the Apartheid thesis can be explained away in the following 
manner: since an indicative ‘if A is the case, then B is the case’ should be interpreted as saying 
‘A implies B in a parameter world’, it is also natural to think that a subjunctive ‘if A were the 
case, then B would be the case’ should be interpreted as saying ‘if A were true, A would imply 
B in a parameter world’. But one can accept that A implies B in a parameter world, at the same 
she denies that if A were true, A would imply B in a parameter world. The error is in assuming 
 
8This example is a modification of the original example presented by Adams (1970, p. 90). Hence the name ‘Adam 
pairs’.   
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that the fact that the antecedent is knowingly false makes any difference to the type of claim 
involving in an implication.   
 The implication heuristic nullifies approaches that give too much importance to the 
grammatical aspects of different conditionals since they are all removed from the expanded 
propositional content. The propositional content of complete conditionals does not admit the 
subjunctive mode of the propositions involved in the implication. For instance, we cannot say 
‘The proposition ‘Kennedy were not killed by Oswald’ entails ‘Someone else would have killed 
Kennedy’, since this is ungrammatical. But if the full propositional content removes the 
subjunctive mode, then all theoretical intuitions motivated by the subjunctive mode are 
eliminated as a consequence. 
 Let’s move on to the next puzzle. The thesis known as the Equation states that the 
probability of A → B is the probability of B given A (Jeffrey, 1963, pp. 702-703). Lewis (1976, 
pp. 299-300) has shown that the acceptance of the equation implies that the probability of A → 
B is the probability of B, which is implausible: the probability of a conditional cannot plausibly 
be the same as the probability of its consequent, e.g., the probability that the match will light 
given that is struck is not intuitively the same as the probability that it will light. 
 However, we can show that a similar result it is not only expected, but intuitively 
satisfactory if we interpret conditionals as implications restricted to a parameter world. In order 
to realize this task, we need to make some assumptions. First, let’s assume that conditional 
probability is primitive, i.e., that Pr(B/A) can’t be defined as Pr(A&B)/Pr(A). Intuitively, I can 
attribute a high probability to B given the assumption of A even if I don’t know the probability 
of A. For instance, I can attribute a high probability to the ceremony being cancelled tomorrow 
given the assumption that there will be a heavy rainfall, even if I don’t know the probability 
that there will be a heavy rainfall tomorrow. Thus, saying that we are considering the 
probability of B given A amounts to saying that we are evaluating the probability of B in a 
context where A is taken as true. Now, if we accept that A → B is an assertion of material 
implication, i.e., equivalent to ¬A ∨ B, and assume the equation, it follows that the probability 
of ¬A ∨ B equals the probability of B given A. But the probability of ¬A ∨ B is the same as the 
probability of B in a context where A is taken as true. In other words, if A is assumed as true, 
the probability of ¬A ∨ B is the same as the probability of B. Now, we already agreed that A → 
B is equivalent to ¬A ∨ B. Consequently, if A is assumed as true, the probability of A → B is 
the same as the probability of B.  
 Another way to see the harmless of the triviality results is to observe that the acceptance 
of A m⊨ B given the belief in A is tracked by the probability attributed to B.  If the probability 
attributed to B is low, so is the acceptance of the assertion of material implication in a context 
where A is taken as true. Properly understood, this result is required to preserve coherence. 
Otherwise, one would be able to accept both an implication statement and its premise, but deny 
its conclusion.     
 Now let’s consider the phenomenon of embedded conditionals. Some will argue that 
the if conditionals were regular truth-valuable sentences, conditional embedding would not be 
so rare and obscure9. But if conditionals are interpreted as claims to implication this rarity 
becomes understandable. If arguments that contain an argument in either its premises or 
conclusion are pretty unusual in theorisation, imagine in natural language. But they can be 
made intelligible with the implication heuristic, even if they happen to be convoluted. For 
instance, the conditional A → (B → C) can be interpreted as ‘A implies that B implies C in a 
 
9 See, for example, Appiah (1985, pp. 205–10), Gibbard (1981, pp. 234–8), Edgington (1995, pp. 280–4), and 
Woods (1997, pp. 58–68).  
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parameter world’. This provides us with a clear rationale to interpret successive reiterations of 
embedding in conditionals, with increasing orders of complexity. We can explain conditionals 
in embedding contexts as composed assertions of implication restricted to parameter worlds. 
Just as we may have one or more premises in an argument, we may have one more proposition 
in an antecedent or consequent. This is another puzzle that was laid to rest. 
 How can we verify a conditional when the antecedent is contrary-to-fact?10 This is the 
problem of counterfactuals. Consider the following example: suppose that my friend almost 
touched a live wire. I say, with a sign of relief: ‘If you had touched that wire, you would get an 
electric shock’. How are we supposed to confirm the conditional if you did not touch the wire? 
There is the intuition that what really interest us is knowing whether she would get an electric 
shock in a hypothetical circumstance where she touched the wire. This intuition can be 
interpreted as a demand for knowing whether the premise of the conditional would imply the 
conclusion in a world where the premise is true. But this is simply a matter of knowing which 
world is taken as a parameter. If the arguer wants to know whether the implication is valid in 
a parameter world where the antecedent is true, and the antecedent is false in the actual world, 
then the actual world is irrelevant; otherwise, it is not irrelevant and the implication is 
vacuously valid. The notion that the only implication conveyed is one where the premise is true 
is misguided, and confuses logic with epistemological considerations. The important thing is 
that while evaluating an argument, the premise and the conclusion are analysed in the same 
parameter world.  
 One could insist that only possible world theories are adequate to capture this intuition, 
but that would be an overly hasty conclusion. For some strange reason people assume that only 
possible world theories are allowed to make use of modal intuitions, and these are the only 
correct modal intuitions. The limits of this point of view become clear when we consider the 
evaluation of a simple (MT). In these cases, there are no possible worlds where both A → B 
and ¬B are true, but ¬A is false; but all the possible worlds where A → B and ¬B are true, are 
worlds where ¬A is true. Otherwise, the first premise would contain a true antecedent and a 
false consequent. Thus, the only meaningful way to make sense of (MT) is to abandon possible 
world theories.  
 Conditionals seem to have a dual nature. On one hand, they are used to represent reality, 
so they have categorical-like features; but on the other hand, they are also inferential in nature, 
so they can be also interpreted as arguments. So are conditionals statements or arguments? 
Maybe both? We have a tried and tested metaphysical vocabulary that allow us to make sense 
of the truth value distinctions of categorical sentences and their connection to reality. But when 
we try to extend this vocabulary to conditional sentences, it falls apart. We can't make heads 
or tails of it. 
 The present interpretation provides an easy answer for this problem: conditional 
statements are claims to a relation of implication between two propositions, the premise 
(antecedent) and the conclusion (consequent). In other words, they are statements about how 
one proposition ensures the truth of another in a parameter world. There is no need to resort to 
a dual nature, for they are categorical statements about facts associated with implication. A 
conditional corresponds to reality if the premise implies the consequent, otherwise they do not. 
 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
10 See Chisholm (1946), Goodman (1947), Will (1947), Watling (1957), Walters (1961), and Tredwell (1965).   
 
  20 
Here, we defended that conditional sentences should be interpreted as assertions of logical 
consequence that can vary in modal range. More specifically, it was also argued that these 
assertions can be plausibly interpreted as having the same truth conditionals of classical 
implication. Interpreting conditionals as claims to implication restricted to a parameter world 
highlights the flexible nature of conditionals, for we can ascertain their truth values in different 
worlds. It also brings formal implication closer to conditionals, since they are simply the same 
type of implication without being restricted to a single world. And, on top of it all, it allows us 
to explain away counter-examples and puzzles that have plagued conditional experts for 
decades. There is no telling how much this hypothesis can affect the recent work in conditional 
logic. This impact includes but is not limited to possible-world semantics, probabilistic 
semantics, conditional assertion theory, works involving belief revision, etc. 
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